

## CHAPTER THREE

### UNTEA 1962

#### **The First Weeks of UNTEA**

A few days before UNTEA assumed control of West New Guinea, the New Guinea Council held a special meeting to bid farewell to Dr. Pieter Johannes Platteel, the territory's Dutch Governor. In attendance, along with the Council members, were senior officials from the incoming UN administration including Rolz-Bennett and Brig. General Said-Uddin Khan, the Pakistani Commander of the UNSF. In a brief speech to the Council, Platteel declared that they should support UNTEA, thereby defending on 'solid grounds' the rights which the Agreement had recognised.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, the Indonesians were making it clear to UNTEA that they intended to become closely involved in administering the territory right from the start. In a memorandum to UNTEA on 28 September 1962, the Indonesian Foreign Affairs Department outlined proposals for cooperation between UNTEA and Indonesia which it claimed were based upon recent discussions between themselves, Rikhye and U Thant. The Indonesians asserted that they had already arranged to meet all UNTEA requirements in the fields of security, administration, economy, education and social work. Furthermore:

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia is prepared to supply all essentials for the daily life of the people in West Irian after the second week of October. The first two weeks of October are needed to collect all the data in this field...[Indonesia] has made available

for immediate use of experts in all fields required by the UNTEA, because of the repatriation of the Netherlands. They will be despatched to West Irian on 24 hours notice.<sup>2</sup>

Significantly, the Indonesians also informed UNTEA that, at the request of “political leaders, missionary leaders and business people of West Irian” they intended to provide ‘leadership’ for the Papuans, to guide and direct them throughout the UNTEA period.<sup>3</sup>

Jakarta justified this by pointing out that the Dutch had done nothing to inform the Papuans about the Agreement or UNTEA. This was true, but they would have had little opportunity to achieve much in the six weeks available before UNTEA’s commencement. However, Indonesia’s self-assigned role was not an agreed part of the New York Agreement and if senior UN officials had, as claimed, accepted Jakarta’s proposals, they would have been undermining their own administration’s authority in advance. In reality, the Indonesians were unable to provide either the finances or the skilled manpower necessary to fulfil promptly their obligations to UNTEA. In late November, Rolz-Bennett noted to U Thant that a request made several weeks previously by UNTEA for Jakarta to provide over 200 officials had still not been met.<sup>4</sup> In the same communication, Rolz-Bennett continued:

taking into account financial difficulties being experienced by Indonesian Government to meet their costs of UNTEA and if you approve, I would discuss with Netherlands Government *inter alia* the following: Whether the Netherlands Government would be agreeable to meet half the cost of subsistence payments to Indonesian troops in WNG as part of UNSF expenses. Question of supplies of perishable foodstuffs by UNTEA to Indonesian troops will probably also arise.<sup>5</sup>

It appeared then that two months after the start of UNTEA Indonesia was still relying on the UN to feed its troops. It was even considered necessary by the UN to ask the Dutch to help finance this supply operation for the Indonesian military. This was particularly controversial since the Indonesian military was to be of questionable benefit to UNTEA and was only there at the insistence of Jakarta.

For Rolz-Bennett, who assumed the role of UNTEA's Temporary Administrator following Plateel's departure, the first weeks of the new administration were dominated by the practicalities of replacing the Dutch administration with as little upheaval as possible. The main contingent of Pakistani troops could not arrive until 7 October and this posed an immediate security problem for UNTEA.

In particular, UNTEA was faced with law and order problems following the reduction of Dutch-led police patrols, particularly in the Baliem Valley where there were press reports of native uprisings at the beginning of October. UNTEA's own report described the situation as more of a localised inter-village dispute with approximately ten fatalities. Police reinforcements were flown to the area on 8 October and a temporary police post was established from which strong patrols of the surrounding district were carried out. The disturbances were considered serious enough to warrant personal visits to the area by Rolz-Bennett, his Chief of Police and the UNSF Commander. However, the local Dutch Inspector in charge was able to assure them that the entire area had been peaceful since 6 October and that no further disturbances were expected.<sup>6</sup>

In the capital, Hollandia, there were a number of incidents of lawlessness in the last few days of Dutch rule. On 1 October, Rolz-Bennett sent a cable to Narasimhan describing how on 27 September, Dutch citizens at a cinema had been alarmed when a number of drunken Papuans burst in brandishing bottles. They feared an assault, but the intruders just attacked each other. More importantly, the next evening a fire destroyed the Hollandia Yacht Club, the only exclusive Dutch club in the town. This was thought by the Acting Dutch Governor to be the work of some of his disgruntled fellow citizens who did not want to leave the club for the Indonesians.<sup>7</sup>

Rolz-Bennett emphasised to Narasimhan in the same telegram that he was very concerned about general security in the town during the hand-over period. Until the Pakistani troops arrived, responsibility for maintaining order lay mainly with the Papuan police force. Rolz-Bennett related how Governor Platteel's departure on 28 September had been disrupted by a drunken Papuan at the airport who had shouted continuously for about 45 minutes while police stood by doing nothing.<sup>8</sup>

He also complained that the Acting Governor had refused his request that the broadcasting station be guarded until UNTEA could take it over. He was told that the police lacked the numbers and capability necessary to carry out the task. In conclusion, Rolz-Bennett made it clear that both he and General Said, the Pakistani UNSF Commander, had already made up their minds about the Papuan police who,

under the terms of the Agreement, were supposed to be the main force for law and order under UNTEA: “Said and I regard Papuan police as helpless and ineffective, meanwhile on 1 October before arrival bulk of UNSF we are left with very little.”<sup>9</sup>

Unsurprisingly, many Dutch UNTEA officials believed that the situation in the territory had deteriorated as soon as the new administration took over. Hank Metzler, the senior Dutch UNTEA official, decided to leave in late November. In a conversation with J.E. Gray of the Australian Liaison Office in Hollandia, he claimed that the territory’s whole administrative machinery was grinding to a halt with the rapid replacement of experienced Dutch personnel by UN staff ill-prepared for administrating a backward colonial territory. He also declared that unemployment was growing as businesses pulled out. Specifically he described how UNTEA’s Department of Economic Affairs was in a state of utter confusion under the leadership of a New Zealander called Hill who, he judged, knew nothing of the territory’s economic situation or how to apply economic theory the critical situation which now pertained in West New Guinea.<sup>10</sup>

Metzler was also scathingly critical of his fellow Dutchman Rozenboom who had been Deputy Chief of Economic Affairs in the colonial administration and now fulfilled a similar function with UNTEA. Metzler dismissed him as an unimpressive buffoon and seemed to suggest that the majority of these few Dutch officials who intended to stay on with UNTEA until the end were less competent in general than those who chose to leave. More importantly, he accused the UNTEA Administration

at the policy-making level of making it patently clear that they had a deep distrust of their Dutch employees, which did little to encourage them to stay.<sup>11</sup> While recognising that Metzler's was a partisan view, Gray nonetheless believed that his attitude was a cause for concern, and in the conclusion to his report of the conversation, painted a very negative picture for his superiors of the first weeks of the UNTEA administration:

While it is appreciated that Metzler is a disgruntled servant of the former administration and, as such, is biased in his views of the present administration, his views are the views of the Dutch who have remained, without whom conditions in this territory would have deteriorated at an even faster rate than they have [done already]. It is undoubtedly true that the UNTEA administration is lacking in the requisite experience called for in running this territory and that there is a marked division of opinion on the implementation of the Netherlands/Indonesian Agreement between the career U.N. officials and some of the temporary administrators, some of whom are former British Colonial officials.....The UNTEA administration is undeniably suffering from lack of cohesion and lack of informed guidance from headquarters in Hollandia, as well as from a grave dearth of capable junior executives and clerical staff. This causes acrimonious accusations and counter accusations and the development of personal feuds, which inevitably leads to a further lowering of efficiency and professional frustration.<sup>12</sup>

Birch, Gray's superior at the Hollandia Liaison Office, shared his pessimism of UNTEA's performance. In a conversation with British officials during a Christmas visit to Canberra, he stated that the administration was struggling along but had been greatly hampered by a lack of personnel to translate the territory's Dutch language files and records. He also commented that there was no sign that the Papuans were competent to take over from those Dutch who had vacated their posts, while all the Indonesians serving in Hollandia were horrified at what they had let themselves in

for, and were doing all they could to prevent their permanent stationing in the territory.<sup>13</sup>

It is not surprising that Australian officials in New Guinea should have held such a negative opinion of UNTEA which many viewed as an organisation more sympathetic to Indonesia than the Netherlands. Most would also have deeply regretted the departure of the Dutch and had many concerns about the prospect of sharing a border with Indonesia. Though prejudiced, these Australian reports can give at least some insight into the first few months of UNTEA's administration and in general seem to be supported by most internal reports made by UNTEA officials themselves.

In his letter to the Foreign Office in August 1963, Harold Luckham described the situation in Fak Fak where he arrived as UNTEA's Divisional Commissioner in late October 1962. In his opinion, relations between Papuans and Indonesians were on the surface easier than they had been in Merauke.<sup>14</sup>

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Luckham explained that the Fak-Fak region was unusual in that it had established links with Indonesia and contained a community of Indonesian settlers as well as some Muslim Papuan villages. Understandably these civilians got on well with the incoming Indonesian troops which went some way to explaining the easier relations described by Luckham. However, this situation was also seen by him as a possible cause for concern.

These Muslim people had, been or thought they had been, neglected by the Dutch and were pro-Indonesian, whereas the bulk of the rest of the population were not, many of them having played an active part in the fighting against the Indonesian invaders. So, as in Merauke, it seemed that, if the pro-Indonesians behaved too aggressively, this would be likely to provoke trouble from the other side. I have mentioned this to make it clear that Indonesian agitation against the UNTEA and the plebiscite would not merely be in direct breach of the Agreement, but would also run the risk of causing serious trouble and making it difficult for the UN authorities to keep the peace and implement the UN side of the bargain.<sup>15</sup>

In Merauke, Divisional Commissioner Wilson submitted a generally upbeat assessment of the situation to 27 October. Administratively, things were under control, communications had improved, a huge backlog of parcel post and seairmail had been cleared and there were no significant shortages of commodities, although those with money were sending it out of the country and the purchasing power of small traders, particularly the Chinese, had diminished. As for the Papuans, Wilson remarked, "Plenty of work and hence income, is one of the best guarantees against internal disturbances."<sup>16</sup> He had praise for the Pakistani troops and the excellent liaison that existed between them, the police, the Indonesian military and himself. Nonetheless, he warned that their lack of knowledge of Malay might result in serious misunderstandings if an internal security situation developed. The behaviour of the Indonesian troops was also praised, though their presence caused "much heart-searching amongst the Papuans."<sup>17</sup> In his conclusion however he had a warning about the coming months:

...it is not administrative problems which are so important, we can get along somehow. The more important problem is the apparent hardening attitude of Papuans against the Agreement which I have reported elsewhere. The administrative problem becomes important when it is appreciated that a reasonably efficient administration

leaves officers free to deal with other important matters which may arise in the future. We would be wise to ensure that the administrative machinery is running smoothly by the end of 1962 at the latest.<sup>18</sup>

### **Indonesia's Campaign Against UNTEA and Papuan Self-Determination**

Into this vulnerable situation a further serious threat to UNTEA's stability was deliberately introduced by one of the central players in the Agreement. Within weeks of UNTEA's arrival, Indonesia began campaigning, first for the authority's early withdrawal, and second for the abandonment of any plans for an eventual "act of self-determination." On 1 November, Rolz-Bennett reported to U Thant that rumours and statements had begun circulating in the territory as well as in Jakarta and Holland that UNTEA was going to transfer control to Indonesia on 1 January 1963.<sup>19</sup>

At this stage it seemed that the Indonesian tactic was to highlight statements by others who supported this move. Seventeen members of the West New Guinea Council visited Jakarta in November and December where they were given prominent coverage in the Indonesian press for expressing these sentiments, as were reports made in the Dutch Socialist weekly, *Het Vrije*, which criticised UNTEA and claimed that the Indonesians could communicate with the Papuans, meet their needs and "offer attractive projects such as the establishment of a University." Uncertain of Jakarta's motivation, Rolz-Bennett speculated on whether this campaign was linked to its difficulties in meeting their share of UNTEA's costs.<sup>20</sup> Henderson noted in his book:

After UNTEA took over...the political climate changed dramatically. The shield of Dutch benevolence was suddenly removed.....For those who remained, Jakarta quickly brought to bear the instrumentalities of coercion and cajolment to force a sea change in their expression of Papuan sentiment. Unhappily, the UN interim administration proved an indifferent champion of Papuan liberties. By November, the New Guinea Council was dutifully calling for an abbreviation of the UNTEA phase and a speedier transfer to Indonesia.<sup>21</sup>

Paul Van der Veur, who spent some time in the territory during the UNTEA period, also noted:

Papuan delegates who were hustled to Djakarta on expense-paid trips quickly experienced the facts of political life. Taken from one event to another, dined, flattered, pressured, and (if necessary) intimidated, those who did not succumb to Indonesian wishes were few indeed. Most signed declarations drawn up for them by their hosts uniformly including four major points: Indonesia was 'one country with one people and one language', the 'August 1945 Indonesian Constitution' was the basis of the Indonesian state; 'UNTEA ought to get out of West Irian by January 1, 1963'; and 'the plebiscite is unnecessary.' Resolutions subscribing to the same four points, signed by leaders speaking in the name of all the people of their areas, mysteriously began to spring up simultaneously all over the territory of West Irian.<sup>22</sup>

Whatever the motivation, it demonstrated that Indonesia was still, even at this stage, clearly intent on winning yet more concessions, despite already having achieved virtually everything it had set out to do with regard to West New Guinea.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio raised the subject with the Iranian Djalal Abdoh, within a week of the latter taking over from Rolz-Bennett as UNTEA Administrator on 15 November. Subandrio suggested that new developments in the territory, such as increasing unemployment, altered the situation and made a speedy integration of West Irian into Indonesia the best way of facilitating reconstruction and

rehabilitation. In support of his position, he cited pro-Indonesian statements recently made by visiting Papuan 'leaders' in Jakarta and recommended that the UN and the Netherlands should pay the "greatest attention to the wishes of the population."<sup>23</sup>

Abdoh gave a contradictory response. First of all he said that UNTEA had to operate according to the terms of the agreement ratified by the UNGA. Therefore any withdrawal before 1 May 1963 was unacceptable. However, he then suggested that any changes to the agreement would have to be agreed by all parties concerned, taking account of the views of the UN. Consequently, he urged that they re-establish diplomatic relations with the Dutch as a pre-condition to 'negotiating' their recommendations. Subandrio agreed to this and asked that U Thant be informed that Jakarta would comply as soon as all Dutch forces had departed from the territory.<sup>24</sup> Abdoh's position would have done little to deter Jakarta from continuing its campaign to undermine the agreement. Nonetheless he subsequently took the view that there should be no shortening of the UNTEA period. In a letter to U Thant on 13 December he commented upon Jakarta's campaign:

Early in November there were definite indications from Djakarta about the intention to advance the date of the transfer of administration from UNTEA to Indonesia. Since then we have received a spate of statements and resolutions emanating from various elements of the local leadership claiming to speak on behalf of substantial sections of the urban population. It is unlikely that this sudden spurt of political activity amongst the so-called 'Papuan Intelligentsia' has any roots in the territory; in all probability it has been inspired, if not engineered, from interested quarters....My own conclusion from a study of the situation is that any proposal for transfer of authority to Indonesia early in January 1963 is completely impracticable.<sup>25</sup>

Rolz-Bennett shared Abdoh's conclusions. Shortly after completing his term as temporary administrator for the territory, he cabled U Thant suggesting that the Secretary-General address a diplomatically-worded private letter to Sukarno in support of maintaining the 1 May 1963 date for transfer to Indonesia:

His attention could be drawn to the political, administrative and practical advantages of keeping to the agreed timetable and to the damage to Indonesia's prestige which would be caused by forcing a change in the agreement as such a move may give rise to doubts, however unfounded, about Indonesia's faithful compliance with agreement as a whole. Doubts would also arise about spontaneous nature of appeals by certain WNG leaders for earlier transfer, as it is a well known fact that such leaders were recently on an extended visit to Djakarta.<sup>26</sup>

As an incentive to Sukarno, Rolz-Bennett also suggested that U Thant assure the President that UNTEA's recruitment of Indonesian officials was proceeding well and that the Administration was about to submit plans to Djakarta for an overall phased recruitment of Indonesian officials which would ensure an almost automatic changeover by 1 May.<sup>27</sup> This suggestion was a further important concession to Indonesia, since the Agreement simply said that Phase One of UNTEA would end on 1 May 1963, after which the second phase would begin. The Second Phase was to last for an indeterminate period, during which the Administrator could transfer all, or part, of the administration to Indonesia whenever he saw fit. Since the Agreement also stated that the "freely expressed will of the population" had to be ascertained before 1969, then theoretically at least, UNTEA could have remained until this had taken place.<sup>28</sup> To confirm to Indonesia five and a half months before the end of Phase One that there would in practice be no Phase Two was another example of UNTEA's weakness.

However, it was the deliberately vague and contradictory nature of the whole New York settlement that facilitated these fundamental concessions to Jakarta. Commenting on the transfer date, Markin reveals how it had already been settled four months previously during the Dutch/Indonesian negotiations:

By shifting this responsibility [for the transfer date] to the United Nations, Netherlands officials hoped to avoid public criticism for having succumbed to Jakarta's demand for accelerated transfer. The Indonesians, in turn, were satisfied because they received an oral assurance from the Dutch delegation that transfer would not only commence, but also conclude, on May 1.<sup>29</sup>

The reference to a supposed Phase Two was therefore simply a small concession to the Dutch. This makes it more understandable that only two brief references to a Second Phase are made in the Agreement, and one of these seems to make little sense. Article XIII declares that the United Nations Security Force (UNSF) will be replaced by Indonesian Security forces after the First Phase, inferring that UNSF will depart, leaving UNTEA's security for Phase Two in the hands of Indonesian controlled forces. In the next sentence, however, it states that UNSF will withdraw upon transfer of administration to Indonesia. These two conflicting statements can only make sense if the understanding was that the end of Phase One and the transfer to Indonesia were to take place at the same time, which of course is what happened.

### **UNTEA Divisional Commissioners' Attitudes Towards the Indonesian Campaign**

Many senior UNTEA officials thought, initially at least, that they should be allowed to function for the agreed seven months and then leave. It surprised and rather disturbed them to find Jakarta so quick to challenge this. What was being proposed was a clear breach of the Agreement and not just a further concession. This may explain why, in the end, UNTEA was uncharacteristically firm on the matter. Nonetheless, on 1 December, these senior officials were asked confidentially by D. A. Sommerville, UNTEA's Director of Internal Affairs, to assess the practicalities of abandoning promises of a plebiscite and withdrawing earlier if this became necessary. Due to poor communications, the report by Fak Fak Divisional Commissioner Luckham was not received, but the others were.

G. Carter, Commissioner of the Central Highlands, replied that while most tribal people were unconcerned whether the date of transfer was accelerated or delayed, the prestige of UNTEA in the eyes of the local population generally would still suffer if Indonesia took over before 1 May. On the subject of the plebiscite he was firm that it should be maintained.<sup>30</sup> Somerville himself and the Divisional Commissioner of Hollandia, believed that an early withdrawal by UNTEA could be achieved without any local dissatisfaction whereas any wavering on the issue of a plebiscite would be seen as a gross breach of faith.<sup>31</sup>

Manokwari Commissioner A. Cameron, declared that UNTEA's premature departure would be seen locally as an indication that the Agreement was dead. In his conversations with politically active urban Papuans, the main feeling was that UNTEA

should not leave early. However, he qualified this by saying that a growing minority of Papuans believed that UNTEA was a delaying factor and an obstacle to direct contact between the locals and the Indonesians. He concluded:

Pressure for an early ending to UNTEA is going to increase and intensify. From January onwards it is going to be increasingly difficult to administer this territory without full co-operation of Indonesia, by February it will be impossible. In the circumstances we must get that co-operation by showing that, subject to international agreement of the parties concerned, we are willing to hand over administration as soon as Indonesia is ready to administer. Present indications are that this will be towards the latter half of February.<sup>32</sup>

J. Robertson, UNTEA's Chief of Police, seemed more convinced than the Divisional Commissioners by the pro-Indonesian campaign. In his report, he declared that there was no doubt in his mind that if the Indonesians took over before 1 May, the Papuans would welcome them, although not perhaps "with open arms."<sup>33</sup>

The Divisional Commissioner for Merauke was an Australian called D. Wilson who, according to his subordinate, the Dutch UNTEA official Frank Hubatka, was capable, honest, open-minded and congenial, with a wonderful sense of humour.<sup>34</sup> He was also blunt in his response to Sommerville's enquiries. On the plebiscite, he predicted that once Indonesia was in charge it would be a simple matter for them to coerce enough Papuans to declare a plebiscite unnecessary, or to have a vote in which 99 per cent were in favour of remaining with Indonesia. He commented that although the Papuans no longer trusted the Dutch or the Indonesians, they still had a "pathetic trust" in UNTEA which they regarded as their "last hope." Any

change to the Agreement would, he suggested, make relations with the Papuans difficult for UNTEA and he advised against it, although he added:

if the date is advanced or if the Agreement is changed doing away with a plebiscite, I do not expect widespread disturbances because we have sufficient forces to control the situation - a whiff of grapeshot can easily control the situation if that is what UNTEA wants.<sup>35</sup>

Finally, G. Rawlings, Commissioner for Biak, was equally blunt. He stated that Indonesian efforts at fabricating evidence in favour of an early end to UNTEA and the abandonment of the plebiscite, were well known. Genuine opinion in his area was far better reflected by the Regional Biak-Numfoor Council which had been elected by the votes of all adults in the area. “ There can be no serious honest doubt that nationalist feelings and resentment against the Indonesians is quite general in that area, and particularly strong amongst the Papuan Police of Biak.”<sup>36</sup>

Members of the Biak-Numfoor Council had drafted a strongly worded resolution on 2 December, refuting the statements of the New Guinea Council members in Jakarta, which they claimed had been coerced. Furthermore, they expressed concern at the suppression of Papuan freedom, even under UNTEA, and declared that the UN was removing West New Guinea from Western colonialism only to hand it over to “an Eastern Republic which is even more ruthless a colonial power.”<sup>37</sup> Instead, they called for a free plebiscite to take place in 1964 under UN auspices. Copies of the resolution were then sent to U Thant, Abdoh and various groups including the Brazzaville group of African nations at the UN.

Rawlings' sympathy was obviously with the Biak Regional Council and he was dismissive of pro-Indonesian Papuans:

I have yet to meet any thinking, sober, generally responsible Papuan who sees good in the coming link with Indonesia. The supporters of Indonesia whom I have met or observed have seemed to be hopeful, willing dupes without a seriously thought out idea in their heads, and no case to state against the arguments of the leaders of the Regional Council...The Indonesian Mission members go so far as to suggest that the showing of a Papuan flag is enough by itself to provoke the pro-Indonesians to physical retaliation. I have even had the impression that the Indonesians would welcome the excuse to oblige us to act firmly against those who oppose them. There is considerable coming and going at the Indonesian Mission of groups of cleanly-dressed Papuans attending lectures, decoration parties or whatnot.<sup>38</sup>

Rawlings also reported that the Indonesians dismissed any evidence of hostility towards themselves as the workings of Dutch UNTEA members. They further suggested that Rawlings' own presence was the only reason that any Papuan resistance to Indonesia existed in his area. For his part, Rawlings predicted that the Indonesians' ruthlessness would result in growing Papuan hatred of them. He also predicted that increasing Indonesian troop and police involvement in suppressing anti-Indonesian demonstrators would result in a general collapse of the administration as Papuan staff refused to work or co-operate:

Unwelcome as the anxiety and resistance of thinking Papuans maybe it is of course hardly surprising if one is not under pressure to close one's eyes to what is in fact happening to this people at the hands of the three parties to the Agreement.<sup>39</sup>

Like his colleagues in other Divisions, Rawlings advised against any abandonment of the plebiscite promise. However, with regard to the UNTEA's length of mission, he believed that its own interests would be best served by leaving as soon

as possible. To this end, despite his sympathy for Papuan nationalists, he made the rather surprising and cynical comment that it was unfortunate that, so far, none of the pro-Indonesians he had met had proposed an early end to UNTEA. Nonetheless, in due course he was sure that they would blindly support any line put out by the Indonesian Mission. In conclusion, Rawlings advice was that the Papuans would need to be let down slowly, if they were not 'to explode':

That there will ultimately be quite serious resistance to the Indonesians is, I think certain...therefore....from the point of view of expediency it behoves the UNTEA to depart as soon as the Indonesians are in fact thick enough on the ground to make acceptable UNTEA administration impossible. At the present pace that is likely to be well before May 1st.<sup>40</sup>

Early acceptance by most of the Divisional Commissioners that UNTEA could withdraw before May was indicative of the mood of uncertainty within the administration and the UN Secretariat over their capacity to resist Indonesian attempts to undermine their mission. In late November, UNTEA Administrator Abdoh had urged Narasimhan to inform U Thant of the need to end uncertainty in the territory about UNTEA's future. If they were to depart early, then he believed that this should be announced as soon as possible. If there was to be no shortening of UNTEA, then U Thant should use his authority to make this very clear to the Indonesians and urge them to end their campaign.<sup>41</sup> Two weeks later, he wrote to the Secretary-General informing him that there had already been sporadic incidents engineered by Indonesian troops to destabilise the smooth running of the administration. He warned that if this continued, he would have to use UNSF to confine the Indonesians to barracks, and that if they resisted, serious clashes would

occur.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, he stated that UNTEA would continue to do its utmost to assert its authority at all times, even though, by mid-February the bulk of UNTEA's 600 staff would be Indonesian "who would owe their allegiance to Indonesia rather than UNTEA."<sup>43</sup> Aware of possible Papuan unrest against UNTEA, he made it clear that if the decision was made to alter the agreement, he wanted permission to inform the Papuans that this was a Indonesian/Dutch decision without any involvement by the UN. To conclude, he made an appeal to U Thant:

I am confident, Mr. Secretary-General, that you would wish to use your own influence and the prestige of your high office to persuade the Government of Indonesia, at the highest level, to offer its co-operation to UNTEA, fully and without any reservations, and thereby enable the United Nations to fulfil its solemn obligations under the terms of the present agreement.<sup>44</sup>

An insight into the methods used by Indonesia in its campaign are revealed in a letter written by Van Diest, the head of the Police branch of the Indonesian UNTEA Mission at Hollandia. A copy of this letter, sent to all the Indonesian Police Commissioners throughout the territory, was obtained by Divisional Commissioner Luckham, in Fak Fak. Dated 18 December, it was accompanied by copies of statements made by Papuan police officers saying how much they respected Indonesia, looked forward to the takeover, supported an early end to UNTEA and did not wish to have a plebiscite. There were also copies of pro-Indonesian speeches and other propaganda. The accompanying instructions in the letter for the Indonesian Police Commissioners stated:

...copies should be distributed to all the members of the police under your command with a supplement to explain the contents as accurately as possible...these attached scripts should be communicated to the public in order to be understood...After having

explained in detail, the contents and the ideas of those statements to the whole Police Corps and to the public, the next task is to do all possible to convince the people and make them realise the truthfulness of those ideas and to get them to act parallel to the general policy of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and to come to a decision that the period of the transitional government of UNTEA should be shortened and the plebiscite planned for 1969 should be considered unnecessary. To achieve this you should act with discretion to the utmost of your powers.<sup>45</sup>

Luckham commented quite correctly that, as an UNTEA employee, Van Diest had no right whatsoever to obey political instructions from Jakarta, although he understood that it would be difficult for him to do otherwise. Luckham immediately sent copies of this letter to Sommerville in Hollandia and to the Commanding Officer of the Pakistani company in Fak Fak, but he claimed that they never responded to him.<sup>46</sup>

### **The Papuan Nationalist March on 1 December**

Indonesia's deliberate policy to undermine UNTEA undoubtedly played a major part in raising tensions in the territory. Papuan nationalists were as aware as UNTEA of the extent of Jakarta's campaign. For those who had seen the UN presence as the last opportunity to exercise genuine self-determination, the apparent weakening of UNTEA's grip must have been a grave cause for concern. Jacob Prai, a Papuan nationalist now living in exile in Sweden commented in 1997 that it soon became clear UNTEA was just a formality which had "no meaning." His response in December 1962, was to establish an underground organisation called the Papuan Youth Movement. This, he claimed, soon succeeded in co-ordinating two thirds of

the high school and university student population of Hollandia (although he gives no indication of the numbers involved).<sup>47</sup>

A focus for the rising tension between Papuan nationalists and the Indonesians was a plan by the Papuan D.V.P. (Democratic Peoples' Party) to organise a peaceful march on 1 December, the first anniversary of the official hoisting of the Papuan flag. The march was to support the Papuan flag and the promise of self-determination. UNTEA Police Headquarters in Hollandia came to know of the details through a source described as "influential in Papuan circles." UNTEA Police Chief Robertson explained to the informer that such a procession would attract counter-demonstrations and claimed that it would almost certainly be banned by UNTEA who would use the police to enforce this. The informer replied that he would do his best to persuade the procession's organisers to call it off.<sup>48</sup>

The opinion of D. Vickers, UNTEA's Legal Adviser, was that the discretion to grant or refuse permission for such processions was not covered by existing law in the territory. His advice was to make it clear to the organisers that any "undesired consequences" should be avoided by modifying their proposals in advance if necessary. These "undesired consequences" were possible outbreaks of violence caused by Indonesian-organised counter-demonstrations. Avoidance of this would prevent UNTEA being compelled to ban the procession or intervene to maintain order.

Although I do not suggest that UNTEA should curtail in any way the political liberty or individual freedom of expression of the

population, I believe that it would be in the interests of the latter that the sponsors of such a procession should be made fully aware in advance of UNTEA's position and of the probable consequences of their action.<sup>49</sup>

It seems therefore that Vickers was sufficiently concerned about the possibility of Indonesian-inspired disruption that he felt it desirable to persuade the procession organisers to "modify their proposals" which, in the case of a peaceful procession could only really mean, calling it off. Consequently, despite his claim to the contrary, Vickers was suggesting a curtailment of Papuan rights of expression, which he apparently considered to less important than UNTEA's aim of leaving the territory without any awkward incidents of major public dissent. This aim was to be a central feature of UNTEA's overall policy in West New Guinea.

Vickers' advice seems to have been followed. On 22 November, Robertson met two senior Papuan policemen, Womsinor and Sarwon. He discussed the consequences of the procession taking place, the threat of anti-nationalists provoking trouble and holding bigger and better-organised processions. Womsinor responded that he was doing all he could to get it cancelled, but that Indonesian military harassment of Papuans was making his job impossible. He even warned that major uprisings were possible if this harassment continued. However, with regard to 1 December, Womsinor still felt that the marchers might be persuaded not to bring Papuan flags with them.<sup>50</sup>

Four days later, Robertson's 'reliable Papuan source' reported on the conclusions of a meeting by nineteen Regional Council members. These men, who were the procession's unofficial organisers, decided that with or without a permit, a peaceful procession with Papuan flags and "UNTEA must stay till May" placards, would go ahead on 1 December. Robertson advised UNTEA that a permit should be given if asked for.<sup>51</sup> His informer also commented that the underlying reasons for the discontent were the people's anger at the pro-Indonesian declarations of the West New Guinea Councillors in Jakarta, and the continuing interference by Indonesian troops in their daily lives.<sup>52</sup> A mere two days later, the informer's information was rather different. He now claimed that interest in the procession had dwindled and that if it went ahead it "will not amount to much."<sup>53</sup>

For its part, Indonesia took the threat of this nationalist Papuan procession very seriously. Arnold Runteboy, its main organiser, flew to Jakarta on about the 17th of November, following an invitation from the Indonesians. Unless their intelligence was better than UNTEA's, this invitation would have been made soon after news of the planned procession reached them.<sup>54</sup> They also shared access to Robertson's 'source', who informed the police chief that Indonesian intelligence officers had also been asking him to use his alleged influence to get the procession called off.<sup>55</sup> A few days later, Robertson reported that Indonesian intelligence were very active in the Hollandia area, contacting Papuans who 'mattered' and building up friendly relations.

Finally, when it seemed that pressure on the Papuans by both UNTEA and Indonesia was not going to be sufficient to prevent the procession, Jakarta turned its attention to U Thant. In a cable on 1 December, the UN representative in Jakarta relayed a message on behalf of Subandrio to the Secretary-General. Subandrio stated that he was aware of the proposed Papuan procession, which he claimed was organised by certain “Dutch colonialist diehards.” He had also been informed that although Abdoh had tried to persuade the organisers to call it off, he did not wish to prohibit it. In the light of this information, he wished U Thant to know that both Sukarno and Subandrio were greatly concerned about the consequences of such demonstrations:

If these anti-Indonesian demonstrations are permitted by UNTEA, pro-Indonesian West Irianese will also demonstrate, which may lead to physical clashes. In event of such disturbances Indonesian troops in territory will protect legitimate Indonesian interests. As of tonight Indonesian troops will be alerted to such eventuality. In these circumstances Republic of Indonesia may abandon its earlier intention to resume diplomatic relations with Netherlands...such demonstrations should be prohibited in the interests of all parties.<sup>56</sup>

It was a blatant and direct threat of violence from the Indonesian Foreign Minister to the UN Secretary-General and it illustrated vividly the extent to which Jakarta was prepared to go to prevent any expressions of Papuan dissent, even while UNTEA was still in charge.

The New York Agreement was unambiguous on the issue of Papuan rights, particularly during the UNTEA period:

The UNTEA and Indonesia will guarantee fully the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of

assembly, of the inhabitants of the area...After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia, Indonesian national laws and regulations will in principle be applicable in the territory, it being understood that they be consistent with the rights and freedoms guaranteed to the inhabitants under the terms of the present agreement.<sup>57</sup>

If the UN was to fulfil its responsibilities in this regard then it had little choice but to allow the procession to take place. In fact, despite assuring the Papuan leaders that a permit would be issued, at the last moment UNTEA refused to do so. At the time, Somerville's official explanation was that the "more responsible leaders" of the procession had agreed to call it off after being persuaded that it would undoubtedly have ended up as a major bloody riot, due to "other political elements in the population also demonstrating."<sup>58</sup> An accurate outline of events was given by Robertson to Abdoh in a confidential cable about the situation:

Long discussions took place between the Chief of Police and Papuan leaders, and arrangements were in hand to issue a permit for the procession which would have been adequately protected from interference by other elements, but at the eleventh hour information was received by the police that a counter-demonstration was being planned and in view of this, no permit to either side was in fact issued.<sup>59</sup>

Van der Veur later remarked that Robertson "understated the case" when he described the agreement to abandon the procession by the "more responsible" leaders: "These leaders were told in no uncertain terms that if they proceeded with the demonstration the Pakistani contingent of the United Nations security force would be used if necessary."<sup>60</sup>

In the event, no procession took place on 1 December, although Papuan flags appeared on official buildings and leaflets supporting UNTEA and the right to a plebiscite were widely distributed throughout Hollandia the night before. To Robertson, it illustrated that the Papuans were unlikely to offer much resistance when transferred to Indonesia and would obey all ‘lawful’ orders if properly explained; “they are more than prepared to settle down with the Indos. in the hope and belief that they will have the opportunity in 1969 to decide their own future.”<sup>61</sup>

There were some disturbances in the Hollandia area on 1 December between pro- and anti-Indonesian Papuans, mainly centred around the activities of Martin Indey, a well-known pro-Indonesian Papuan. At 9 a.m. some Papuans in a vehicle stopped a group of Indey’s Papuan supporters, who were on foot. Indey’s group were carrying Indonesian flags which were taken off them.<sup>62</sup> Shortly afterwards, Indey and a plain-clothed Indonesian colleague armed with a Sten gun stopped a vehicle near Sentani. It is not clear whether this was the same vehicle involved in the previous incident, but it was adorned with a Papuan flag, which Indey confiscated, and contained three Papuan civilians who later reported the incident to the police. This second incident was particularly awkward for UNTEA, which was in the process of withdrawing firearms from Papuan security forces, presumably to prevent them from attacking Indonesians. This now had to be justified in the knowledge that plain-clothed Indonesians were intimidating civilians with automatic weapons.<sup>63</sup> Later on in the day, Indey threw a hand grenade ( fortunately with the pin still in) at a crowd of

Papuans who had gathered outside his house to shout abuse at him. He also fired a pistol shot in the air which dispersed the crowd.

Two days later, Robertson and an Indonesian Police Inspector visited Indey, who claimed that Rikhye had given him the gun to defend himself. This was very unlikely, but by this time the weapon had disappeared. Afterwards, Robertson reported “ No immediate action was taken against Indey [straight away] as this might have resulted in a serious clash, for it is known that Indo. troops frequent his house at times.”<sup>64</sup>

The abandonment of the procession undermined the arguments of those who warned of eventual resistance to Indonesian rule. It also did nothing to encourage Robertson and the UNTEA leadership to stand up to the Indonesians.

Given that all senior UNTEA officials involved had opposed an outright banning of the procession, it seems fairly certain that the last-minute decision not to issue a permit was largely a reaction by the UN Secretariat in New York to Subandrio’s direct threat. This was a key example of the Secretariat’s appeasement in the face of Indonesian intimidation, and it must have given a clear message to the UNTEA leadership that they could expect little support from U Thant in any dispute with Indonesia. Under such circumstances, it was impossible for UNTEA to carry out its responsibilities as laid down in the Agreement, particularly where they related to Papuan rights.

Further evidence of UNTEA's attitude towards the political rights of the Papuans preceded the 5 December session of the New Guinea Council. By this time, most remaining members had publicly expressed support for Indonesia's position on the territory, but Van der Veur claims that Abdoh still required those wishing to speak at the session to submit their speeches in advance to Vickers, the legal adviser:

Vickers noted that the speeches of [Council members] Tanggahma and Poana contained a number of sections which, in his view, did not seem pertinent in a closing session and might not be liked by the Indonesians. Rather than have their speeches censored, both councillors retracted their request to speak.<sup>65</sup>

If this allegation is correct, it was a clear breach of the Agreement's article XXII guaranteeing the population's right to free speech.

Such appeasement of Jakarta was not confined to political matters. On 21 December, Donald Clump, manager of a construction company, alleged that he had lost valuable business in the territory because of collusion between UNTEA and Indonesia. Clump claimed that he had submitted a carefully-worded estimate to UNTEA for the completion of the council chambers and the Hall of Justice left unfinished by the Dutch. A UNTEA official promised him at least half the work and he had travelled to Hollandia to finalise the arrangements. But, on his arrival, the same official informed him that the Indonesians would now be given the whole contract. Clump claimed that Indonesia had vetoed UNTEA's earlier promise to him. Furthermore, he had managed to get hold of the Indonesian estimate and found it to be a virtual carbon copy of his own except that the cost was slightly less.<sup>66</sup>

### **Increasing Tension and Outbreaks of Violence**

It is important to remember that the tensions created by Indonesian interference and Papuan anxiety developed in a pre-existing atmosphere of mutual hostility between many of the Papuans and the Indonesians. In the first weeks of UNTEA, Papuan protests had often been symbolic. Papuan flags were flown throughout the territory and on, at least one occasion, Indonesian officials arriving from Jakarta refused to ride on the UNTEA vehicles provided, because they had been decorated with Papuan flags. In reaction, Jakarta demanded that UNTEA take firm action to prevent such “dangerous escalations.”<sup>67</sup> Although the Dutch had certainly encouraged these nationalist feelings and the anti-Indonesian sentiment, the Indonesian troops had done nothing to undermine this Papuan prejudice once they arrived in the territory. As the last Dutch troops departed on 22 November 1962, Indonesian confidence in their own growing power became more apparent as clashes between themselves and Papuans increased.

In early November, tension grew between the Papuan police and Indonesian troops over the question of guarding Sentani Airstrip near Hollandia. This was officially a police responsibility, but Indonesian soldiers had apparently decided to usurp them. Despite assurances from the C.O. Indonesian contingent (UNSF), Colonel Soedarto, that the police would be allowed to carry out their duty, a Papuan Police Inspector, along with six of his men and an Indonesian Police Inspector, arrived at the airstrip on 20 November to find it surrounded by armed Indonesian

soldiers. The police were then held at gun- point by the troops and prevented from entering the area. They also witnessed the troops stopping two Papuan boys with Papuan flags on their bikes. The flags were removed and ripped up despite complaints from the Papuan Inspector. Following protests by UNTEA, Colonel Soedarto again promised to deal with his troops and apologised for the incident.<sup>68</sup>

This incident may have been prompted by the previous day's action's by New Guinea Council member Hendrik Joku.<sup>69</sup> Joku had gone to the airstrip on the same day that Subandrio's wife had flown out, and distributed Papuan nationalist leaflets to all incoming passengers, regardless of nationality. The leaflets called for Papuan freedom no later than 1970.<sup>70</sup>

On 15 November, in what appeared to be a show of authority, Indonesian troops based near Sorong took over the public highway in front of their camp and commenced morning physical exercises. Passing vehicles were ordered to slow down, including a Papuan Police jeep which stopped on being confronted by the troops. But an accompanying police motor cyclist missed the signal and continued, whereupon he was kicked and attacked with a belt by the Indonesians before escaping. The troops then attacked the two policemen in the jeep. On hearing of the incident, an armed Papuan police detachment (the UN report does not give its strength), accompanied by 300 Papuan civilians, prepared to attack the Indonesian camp. This was only prevented by a police inspector who managed to order the police back to barracks and disperse the civilians.<sup>71</sup>

Further violent clashes occurred between Indonesian troops and Papuans in late November but more serious incidents took place in the final weeks of 1962. On 10 December, Indonesian troops at Merauke airstrip opened fire on a group of Papuan demonstrators, injuring two. Two days later, following an argument between a Papuan policeman and an Indonesian soldier, Indonesian troops attacked a police station in Sorong killing one policeman and injuring three. They also injured two Dutch civilians in a separate attack. Some of the troops involved were irregulars from a battalion known as 'Pattimura', described by an Indonesian Army Officer present as being out of his control.<sup>72</sup>

In response, UNTEA protested to the Indonesian military, arguing that the irregular troops should rapidly be replaced by regulars. Indonesia's C-in-C General Ahmed Yani apologised and agreed to the request.<sup>73</sup> Abdoh also protested to the Indonesian Mission in the territory and asked them to use their influence to restrain the Indonesian troops. With regard to the Mission's own activities, he informed Narasimhan:

The Indonesian Mission have been opening their sub-offices in the Territory and in order to have a closer watch on the movements and activities of the personnel of these offices, I have formally requested the Mission to give us advance information of the itinerary of travels of these officials, ostensibly to give protection and facilities to them, but in fact to have a regular and timely watch on their activities which, I have reason to believe, are somewhat responsible for stirring up feelings among the population.<sup>74</sup>

By using the Pattimura Battalion as a scapegoat, both sides were able to divert attention away from the uncomfortable fact that regular Indonesian troops had been involved in even more violent incidents with Papuans than the irregulars. The incident at Merauke, which involved paratroops, had actually been witnessed by Divisional Commissioner Wilson. In a letter to Somerville, he stated that UNTEA should be liable to pay compensation to the injured. Describing the incident at Merauke airstrip he stated:

During this [Papuan] demonstration there was an unlawful attack by Indonesian paratroops on the Papuans who had gathered together under a nearby tree by the Resident. The action by the paratroops was completely unauthorised by the Resident and therefore conflicted with the Agreement whereby the police are responsible for all law and order and that Pakistan troops and Indonesian troops may only be called upon by the proper authority. During the attack by the paratroops I personally witnessed from a distance of approximately 30 yards an Indonesian soldier pointing his gun at a Papuan by the name of Lucas Mahuze who was about 5 yards distant from him. The Papuan was unarmed and had his hands up and his back half turned towards the soldier. I saw the soldier, for no apparent reason, fire at the feet of the Papuan wounding him in the ankle. There was absolutely no justification for the soldier to fire at this man.<sup>75</sup>

He added, that in normal circumstances, an incident of this nature would result in an official enquiry to determine responsibility. However, in this case “for reasons which are known to you,” no formal enquiry was conducted by UNTEA.<sup>76</sup> This armed assault on civilians in full view of a UNTEA Divisional Commissioner, clearly demonstrated the Indonesian regular army’s attitude, but also its attitude, not only to those who opposed Indonesian rule, but also to UNTEA’s authority in the territory.

The incident at Sorong had begun because a Papuan Policeman had visited the quay-side to investigate a Dutch ferry captain's complaint that Indonesian troops "had cut his motor." The Indonesians' reaction to being questioned was to beat the policeman up. The police then detained one soldier and this had precipitated the attack on the police station by the Indonesians. Later in the day, Indonesian troops opened fire at the quay-side on a car carrying the ferry captain and three Dutch colleagues. The Dutch got out and sheltered in a ditch while the troops continued firing at them, despite repeated orders to stop by an Indonesian paratroop lieutenant.<sup>77</sup>

A week before the assaults, Chief of Police Robertson had observed that the Papuans in Merauke disliked the Indonesian soldiers and provoked them on the slightest pretext.<sup>78</sup> This argument that the problem lay more with the Papuans was also expressed by the Indonesians. Colonel Soedarto's response to the Indonesian attacks was to observe that the Papuan police and military (the Papuan Volunteer Corps) had an "ideology and doctrine" totally different from the Indonesian army's. To solve this problem, he suggested that the entire Papuan Police force and the PVK be sent to Indonesia "to pursue education commensurate with their ranks and functions," presumably leaving more security responsibilities in the hands of the paratroops and the Pattimura Battalion:

I assure you that when coming back to this territory, the said forces will have fully understood the actual functions of the police and armed forces in general. This proposal is submitted with the sole purpose to help the UNTEA in smoothing its administration.<sup>79</sup>

Soedarto was less inclined to repatriate any of the Indonesian soldiers involved in violence. He felt that this would not solve any problems as long as the Dutch-created forces had “not been indoctrinated in accordance with the spirit of the Agreement.”<sup>80</sup> What he meant by the ‘spirit of the Agreement’ is not clear, but it could have had little in common with the actual text of the Agreement signed by Indonesia four months previously. The ‘problem’ of the Papuan police and the PVK was an issue that had been brought up by the Indonesians before. In late October 1962, General Nasution in Jakarta had expressed anxiety to Brigadier Said, head of Pakistan’s UNSF contingent, about the ‘loyalty’ of the Papuan police and suggested taking some to Indonesia to visit Indonesian police units.<sup>81</sup> Said felt that this was a reasonable request, and also agreed with Nasution’s idea of putting security personnel at the ports and airports to “prevent any undesirable elements amongst civilian officials and visitors establishing themselves in the territory.”<sup>82</sup> Whether Nasution meant Indonesian personnel is not clear, but Said’s sympathy for the idea seems unfortunate in the light of the Indonesian violence that took place at the airfield two months later.

## **Summary**

The year 1962 ended with West New Guinea increasingly under Indonesian control, despite the presence of UNTEA. From the start, Indonesians both inside and outside the territory had worked to undermine UNTEA’s authority, while at the same time building up their own position of power. It was made clear that any Papuan resistance to Jakarta would not be tolerated and could expect a violent Indonesian

response. What Papuan leadership there was had been targeted by Indonesia so that most members of the New Guinea Council, once a symbol of West Papuan nationalism, became simply mouth-pieces for the official Jakarta position. This is not to say that Papuan nationalist opinion had been silenced, but rather the nationalists were not adequately organised, and that without UNTEA's protection, they found it more and more difficult to confront the Indonesians' increasingly aggressive and confident campaign.

Abdoh and the UNTEA administration also quickly realised that Indonesia would not be content to allow their symbolic presence in the territory to run its course. The first three months of their administration had been taken up with Sukarno's campaign to remove them from power. They had operated in an atmosphere of constant pressure from Jakarta for further concessions, with little support from the UN in New York. It had become clear that the most they could achieve would be to finish their mission in West New Guinea without an obvious breakdown in their authority. Despite the efforts of sections of the security forces on the ground, protection of Papuan rights was not a priority.

Time had moved on. In the month that UNTEA began, the international community was gripped by the Cuba missile crisis and the possibility of nuclear annihilation. Put in this context, it is easy to understand why the UN, and the World in general, was untroubled by events in New Guinea and the undermining of an

agreement that was, in reality, only a face-saving device for a minor European power, and never meant to be a guarantor of genuine Papuan self-determination.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Notes.

1. UN Press Services, Office of Public Information, UN New York Press Release WNG/29, 1 October 1962.
2. UN: DAG 13/2.1.01:8. Departemen Luar Negeri Republik (Dept. of Foreign Affairs Jakarta), Indonesia memo, 28 September 1962.
3. *ibid*
4. UN: DAG 1/ 2.2.3:9. Cable from Rolz-Bennett in Jakarta to UN Secretary-General U Thant, 22 November 1962.
5. *ibid*
6. UN: DAG 13/2.1.01:11. Cable from UNTEA to OMNIPRESS, Sydney, 16 October 1962.
7. UN: DAG 1/ 2.2.3:9. Cable from Rolz-Bennett to Narasimhan, 1 October 1962.
8. *ibid*
9. *ibid*
10. NAA: A1838/280, 3036/6/1 part 83. Record of conversation between J E Gray of the Australian Liaison Office Hollandia and Hank Metzler, Senior Dutch UNTEA official, 26 November 1962.
11. *ibid*
12. *ibid*
13. PRO: FO 371/169952. E V Vines of the British High Commission Canberra to A S Fair, Commonwealth Relations Office London, 14 January 1963.
14. PRO: FO 371/169951 (DJ 1013/11A). Letter from Harold Luckham to the Foreign Office, 24 August 1963.
15. *ibid*
16. UN: DAG 13/ 2.1.0.0:1. Report by UN Divisional Commissioner South New Guinea to Chief Administration Officer UNTEA. "Summary of Position to 27 October 1962".

17. *ibid*
18. *ibid*
19. UN: DAG 1/ 2.2.3:9. Cable from Rolz-Bennett to U Thant, 1 November 1962.
20. *ibid*
21. W Henderson, West New Guinea, the Dispute and its Settlement, p.221.
22. Paul Van der Veur, “The UN in West Irian: A Critique”, p.63.
23. UN: DAG 1/ 2.2.3:9. Cable from Abdoh in Jakarta to U Thant, 10 November 1963.
24. *ibid*
25. UN: DAG 1/ 5.2.2.8:1. Cable from Abdoh to U Thant, 13 December 1962.
26. UN: DAG 1/2.2.3.9. Cable from Rolz-Bennett to U Thant, 22 November 1962
27. *ibid*
28. Articles XVII and XX of the New York Agreement signed between Indonesia and the Netherlands, 15 August 1962.
29. Markin, “The West New Guinea Dispute”, Ph.D thesis, p.400.
30. UN: DAG 1/5.2.2.8:1. Cable from Abdoh to U Thant, 13 December 1962.
31. *ibid*
32. UN: DAG 13/ 2.1.0.1:3. Special Report by UN Divisional Commissioner Manokwari to Somerville, UNTEA Director of Internal Affairs, 10 December 1962.
33. UN: DAG 1/5.2.2.8:1. Quoted in a cable from Abdoh to U Thant, 13 December 1962.
34. Interview with Frank Hubatka, Nieuwegein, The Netherlands, 20 November 1999.
35. UN: DAG 13/ 2.1.0.1:3. Report by D. Wilson, (Divisional Commissioner Merauke) to Somerville, 8 December 1962.
36. UN: DAG 13/2.1.0.1:3. Report by G. Rawlings, (Divisional Commissioner Biak) to Somerville, 12 December 1962.

37. Paul Van der Veur, "The UN in West Irian: A Critique", p.65.
38. UN: DAG 13/2.1.0.1:3. Report by Rawlings to Somerville, 12 December 1962.
39. *ibid*
40. *ibid*
41. UN: DAG 13/ 2.1.00:1. Cable from Abdoh to Narasimhan, 29 November 1962.
42. UN: DAG 1/5.2.2.8:1. Cable from Abdoh to U Thant *op cit*, 13 December 1962.
43. *ibid*
44. *ibid*
45. PRO: FO 371/169951 (DJ 1013/11A). Letter from Van Diest, Head of Police Branch of the Indonesian Mission in Hollandia, to all Indonesian Commissioners of Police in West New Guinea, 18 December 1962. Attached to a letter from Harold Luckham to the Foreign Office, 23 August 1963.
46. PRO: FO 371/169951 (DJ 1013/11A). Letter from Harold Luckham to the Foreign Office, 23 August 1963.
47. Correspondence by author with Jacob Prai in Malmo, Sweden, June 1997.
48. UN: DAG 13/ 2.1.00:1. UNTEA Daily Police Report by Chief of Police J. Robertson, 20 November 1962.
49. UN: DAG 13/ 2.1.0.1:18. Letter from UNTEA Legal Adviser D. Vickers to Abdoh, 17 November 1962.
50. UN: DAG 13/2.1.00:1. UNTEA Daily Police Report by J. Robertson, 22 November 1962.
51. *ibid*, 26 November 1962.
52. *ibid*, 24 November 1962.
53. *ibid*, 28 November 1962.
54. *ibid*, 24 November 1962.
55. *ibid*

56. UN: DAG 1/ 2.2.3:9. Cable from Pavicic in Jakarta to U Thant, 1 December 1962.
57. Article XXII, item 1 and Article XIV of the New York Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands, 15 August 1962.
58. Paul Van Der Veur, "The UN in West Irian: A Critique", p.71.
59. UN: DAG 13/ 2.1.01:8. Letter from Robertson to Abdoh, "Letter from the International Red Cross", (c. December 1962).
60. Paul Van der Veur, "The UN in West Irian: A Critique", p.71.
61. UN: DAG 13/2.1.0.1:18. UNTEA Daily Police Report by J. Robertson, 1 December 1962.
62. *ibid*, 4 December 1962.
63. *ibid*, 1 December 1962.
64. *ibid*, 4 December 1962.
65. Paul Van Der Veur, "The UN in West Irian: A Critique", p.69.
66. UN: DAG 13/ 2.1.01:11. Incoming Cable to UNTEA Hollandia, (c. December 1962).
67. UN: DAG 1/ 2.2.3:10. Cable from UN New York to Narasimhan, 22 October 1962.
68. UN: DAG 13/2.1.0.1:18. UNTEA Daily Police Report by J. Robertson, 22 November 1962.
69. Henk Joku fled to Papua New Guinea from Irian Jaya in 1975 and became a senior spokesperson for the Free Papua movement (OPM).
70. UN: DAG 13/2.1.0.1:18. UNTEA Daily Police Report by J. Robertson, 24 November 1962.
71. *ibid*, 28 November 1962.
72. UN: DAG 13/ 2.1.01:5. Cable from Abdoh to Narasimhan, "Sorong Incidents, Claims in General," 20 December 1962.
73. *ibid*
74. *ibid*

75. UN: DAG 13/ 2.1.01:18. Report by D Wilson to Somerville, "Compensation to Lucas Mahuze on Account of Unlawful Wounding", 9 March 1963.

76. *ibid*

77. UN: DAG 13/2.1.0.1:18. UNTEA Daily Police Report by J. Robertson, 18 December 1962.

78. *ibid*, 5 December 1962.

79. UN: DAG 13/ 2.1.01:5. Letter from Col. Soedarto, Commanding Officer, Indonesian Contingent, UNSF to Abdoh, 20 December 1962..

80. *ibid*

81. UN: DAG 1/2.2.3 (2:1). Cable from Brigadier Said, Commanding Officer, Pakistani Contingent, (UNSF) to Narasimhan, 22 October 1962.

82. *ibid*